EEMCS EPrints Service
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Corin, R.J. and Durante, A. and Etalle, S. and Hartel, P.H.
(2003)
A Trace Logic for Local Security Properties.
In: Proceedings of the International Workshop on Software Verification and Validation (SVV 2003), December 14 2003, Mumbai, India.
pp. 129-143.
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 118.
Elsevier.
ISSN 1571-0661
Full text available as:
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2004.12.019 AbstractWe propose a new simple trace logic that can be used to specify local security properties, i.e. security properties that refer to a single participant of the protocol specification. Our technique allows a protocol designer to provide a formal specification of the desired security properties, and integrate it naturally into the design process of cryptographic protocols. Furthermore, the logic can be used for formal verification. We illustrate the utility of our technique by exposing new attacks on the well studied TMN protocol.
Export this item as: To correct this item please ask your editor Repository Staff Only: edit this item |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||