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789 Virtual Analysis and Reduction of Side-Channel Vulnerabilities of Smartcards

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den Hartog, J.I. and de Vink, E.P. (2004) Virtual Analysis and Reduction of Side-Channel Vulnerabilities of Smartcards. In: 2nd Int. Workshop on Formal Aspect of Security and Trust (FAST), Toulouse, France. pp. 85-98. Kluwer Academic Publishers. ISBN 0-387-24050-0

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24098-5_7

Abstract

This paper focuses on the usability of the PINPAS tool. The PINPAS tool is an instruction-level interpreter for smartcard assembler languages, augmented with facilities to study side-channel vulnerabilities. The tool can simulate side-channel leakage and has a suite of utilities to analyze this. The usage of the tool, for the analysis of a cryptographic algorithm is illustrated using the standard AES and RSA. Vulnerabilities of the implementations are identified and protective measures added. It is argued, that the tool can be instrumental for the design and realization of secure smartcard implementations in a systematic way.

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Paper (Proceedings UNSPECIFIED, Presentation Type UNSPECIFIED)
Research Group:	EWI-DIES: Distributed and Embedded Security
Research Program:	CTIT-ISTRICE: Integrated Security and Privacy in a Networked World
Research Project:	PINPASJC: Program Inferred Power Analysis in Software -- JavaCard
Additional Information:	Imported from DIES
ID Code:	789
Status:	Published
Deposited On:	12 December 2005
Refereed:	Yes
International:	Yes
More Information:	statistics

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