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Corin, R.J. and Etalle, S. and Hartel, P.H. and Mader, A.H.
(2004)
Timed Model Checking of Security Protocols.
In: 2nd ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering: From Specifications to Code (FMSE), Fairfax, Virginia.
pp. 23-32.
ACM Press.
ISBN 1-58113-971-3
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Official URL: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1029133.1029137 AbstractWe propose a method for engineering security protocols that are aware of timing aspects. We study a simplified version of the well-known Needham Schroeder protocol and the complete Yahalom protocol. Timing information allows the study of different attack scenarios. We illustrate the attacks by model checking the protocol using Uppaal. We also present new challenges and threats that arise when considering time.
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