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Corin, R.J. and Doumen, J.M. and Etalle, S.
(2004)
Analysing Password Protocol Security Against Off-line Dictionary Attacks.
In: Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Security Issues with Petri Nets and other Computational Models (WISP 2004), 26 June 2004, Bologna, Italy.
pp. 47-63.
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 121.
Elsevier.
ISSN 1571-0661
Full text available as:
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2004.10.007 AbstractWe study the security of password protocols against off-line dictionary attacks. In addition to the standard adversary abilities, we also consider further cryptographic advantages given to the adversary when considering the password protocol being instantiated with particular encryption schemes. We work with the applied pi-calculus of Abadi and Fournet, in which the (new) adversary abilities are modelled as equations between terms. As case studies, we analyse the Encrypted Password Transmission (EPT) protocol of Halevi and Krawczyk, and the wellknown Encrypted Key (EKE) of Bellovin and Merritt. In the latter, we find an attack that arises when considering the ability of distinguishing ciphertexts from random noise. We propose a modification to EKE that prevents this attack.
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