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762 Formal Analysis of a Fair Payment Protocol
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Cederquist, J.G. and Torabi Dashti, M. (2004) Formal Analysis of a Fair Payment Protocol. In: 2nd International Workshop on Formal Aspect of Security and Trust (FAST), 22-27 Aug 2004, Toulouse, France. pp. 41-54. IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 173. Kluwer Academic Publishers. ISBN 9780387240503

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24098-5_4

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Abstract

We formally specify a payment protocol described by Vogt et al. This protocol is intended for fair exchange of time-sensitive data. Here the mCRL language is used to formalize the protocol. Fair exchange properties are expressed in the regular alternation-free mu-calculus. These properties are then verified using the finite state model checker from the CADP toolset. Proving fairness without resilient communication channels is impossible. We use the Dolev-Yao intruder, but since the conventional Dolev-Yao intruder violates this assumption, it is forced to comply to the resilient communication channel assumption.

Item Type:Conference or Workshop Paper (Proceedings UNSPECIFIED, Presentation Type UNSPECIFIED)
Research Group:EWI-DIES: Distributed and Embedded Security
Research Program:CTIT-ISTRICE: Integrated Security and Privacy in a Networked World
Research Project:Account: Accountability in Electronic Commerce Protocols
Additional Information:Imported from DIES
ID Code:762
Status:Published
Deposited On:12 December 2005
Refereed:Yes
International:Yes
More Information:statisticsmetis

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