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Law, Yee Wei and van Hoesel, L.F.W. and Doumen, J.M. and Hartel, P.H. and Havinga, P.J.M. (2005) Energy-Efficient Link-Layer Jamming Attacks against Wireless Sensor Network MAC Protocols. In: 3rd ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (SASN), Alexandria, Virginia. pp. 76-88. ACM Press. ISBN 1-59593-227-5
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1102219.1102234
A typical wireless sensor node has little protection against radio jamming. The situation becomes worse if energy efficient jamming can be achieved by exploiting knowledge of the data link layer. Encrypting the packets may help prevent the jammer from taking actions based on the content of the packets, but the temporal arrangement of the packets induced by the nature of the protocol might unravel patterns that the jammer can take advantage of even when the packets are encrypted. By looking at the packet interarrival times in three representative MAC protocols, S-MAC, LMAC and B-MAC, we derive several jamming attacks that allow the jammer to jam S-MAC, LMAC and B-MAC energy-efficiently. The jamming attacks are based on realistic assumptions. The algorithms, using expectation maximization in case of S-MAC, or K-means in case of LMAC, or low-power listening in case of B-MAC, are described in detail and simulated. The effectiveness and efficiency of the attacks are examined. The result of this investigation provides new insights into the security considerations of MAC protocols.
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