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22269 N-gram Against the Machine: On the Feasibility of the N-gram Network Analysis for Binary Protocols
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Hadžiosmanović, D. and Simionato, L. and Bolzoni, D. and Zambon, Emmanuele and Etalle, S. (2012) N-gram Against the Machine: On the Feasibility of the N-gram Network Analysis for Binary Protocols. In: Proceedings of the 15th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID 2012), 12-14 Sep 2012, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. pp. 354-373. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7462. Springer Verlag. ISSN 0302-9743 ISBN 978-3-642-33337-8

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In recent years we have witnessed several complex and high-impact attacks specifically targeting “binary” protocols (RPC, Samba and, more recently, RDP). These attacks could not be detected by current – signature-based – detection solutions, while – at least in theory – they could be detected by state-of-the-art anomaly-based systems. This raises once again the still unanswered question of how effective anomaly-based systems are in practice. To contribute to answering this question, in this paper we investigate the effectiveness of a widely studied category of network intrusion detection systems: anomaly-based algorithms using n-gram analysis for payload inspection. Specifically, we present a thorough analysis and evaluation of several detection algorithms using variants of n-gram analysis on real-life environments. Our tests show that the analyzed systems, in presence of data with high variability, cannot deliver high detection and low false positive rates at the same time.

Item Type:Conference or Workshop Paper (Full Paper, Talk)
Research Group:EWI-DIES: Distributed and Embedded Security
Research Program:CTIT-ISTRICE: Integrated Security and Privacy in a Networked World
Research Project:MIDAS: Intrusion detection for SCADA, CASTOR: Controlling Access to SCADA Networked Systems, HERMES: Host-based Event Mining in SCADA systems
Uncontrolled Keywords:N-gram, feasibility, binary protocol, detection
ID Code:22269
Deposited On:03 October 2012
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