EEMCS EPrints Service
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Pieters, W. and Coles-Kemp, L.
(2011)
Reducing normative conflicts in information security.
In: Proceedings of the 2011 New security paradigms workshop, NSPW '11, 12-15 Sep 2011, Marin County, CA.
pp. 11-24.
ACM.
ISBN 978-1-4503-1078-9
Full text available as:
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2073276.2073279 ![]() AbstractSecurity weaknesses often stem from users trying to comply with social expectations rather than following security procedures. Such normative conflicts between security policies and social norms are therefore undesirable from a security perspective. It has been argued that system developers have a "meta-task responsibility", meaning that they have a moral obligation to enable the users of the system they design to cope adequately with their responsibilities. Depending on the situation, this could mean forcing the user to make an "ethical" choice, by "designing out" conflicts. In this paper, we ask the question to what extent it is possible to detect such potential normative conflicts in the design phase of security-sensitive systems, using qualitative research in combination with so-called system models. We then envision how security design might proactively reduce conflict by (a) designing out conflict where possible in the development of policies and systems, and (b) responding to residual and emergent conflict through organisational processes. The approach proposed in this paper is a so-called subcultural approach, where security policies are designed to be culturally sympathetic. Where normative conflicts either cannot be avoided or emerge later, the organisational processes are used to engage with subcultures to encourage communally-mediated control.
Export this item as: To request a copy of the PDF please email us request copy To correct this item please ask your editor Repository Staff Only: edit this item |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
