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Corin, R.J. and Saptawijaya, A. and Etalle, S.
(2006)
A Logic for Constraint-based Security Protocol Analysis.
In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 21-25 May 2006, Oakland, US.
pp. 155-168.
IEEE Computer Society.
ISBN 0-7695-2574-1
Full text available as:
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2006.3 ![]() AbstractWe propose PS-LTL, a pure-past security linear temporal logic that allows the specification of a variety of authentication, secrecy and data freshness properties. Furthermore, we present a sound and complete decision procedure to establish the validity of security properties for symbolic execution traces, and show the integration with constraint-based analysis techniques.
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