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Pieters, W.
(2009)
Combatting electoral traces: the Dutch tempest discussion and beyond.
In: E-Voting and Identity: Second International Conference, VOTE-ID 2009, 7-8 Sep 2009, Luxembourg city, Luxembourg.
pp. 172-190.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5767.
Springer Verlag.
ISSN 0302-9743
ISBN 978-3-642-04134-1
This is the latest version of this eprint. Full text available as:
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04135-8_11 ![]() AbstractIn the Dutch e-voting debate, the crucial issue leading to the abandonment of all electronic voting machines was compromising radiation, or tempest: it would be possible to eavesdrop on the choice of the voter by capturing the radiation from the machine. Other countries, however, do not seem to be bothered by this risk. In this paper, we use actor-network theory to analyse the socio-technical origins of the Dutch tempest issue in e-voting, and we introduce concepts for discussing its implications for e-voting beyond the Netherlands. We introduce the term electoral traces to denote any physical, digital or social evidence of a voter’s choices in an election. From this perspective, we provide a framework for risk classification as well as an overview of countermeasures against such traces.
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