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Pieters, W.
(2009)
Reve{a,i}ling the risks: a phenomenology of information security
Technical Report TR-CTIT-09-33,
Centre for Telematics and Information Technology University of Twente, Enschede.
ISSN 1381-3625
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![]() AbstractIn information security research, perceived security usually has a negative meaning, when it is used in contrast to actual security. From a phenomenological perspective, however, perceived security is all we have. In this paper, we develop a phenomenological account of information security, where we distinguish between revealed and reveiled security instead. Linking these notions with the concepts of confidence and trust, we are able to give a phenomenological explanation of the electronic voting controversy in the Netherlands.
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