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Heydenreich, B. and Müller, R. and Uetz, M.J. and Vohra, R.
(2009)
Characterization of revenue equivalence.
Econometrica, 77 (1).
pp. 307-316.
ISSN 0012-9682
*** ISI Impact 4 ***
This is the latest version of this eprint. Full text available as:
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ECTA7168 ![]() AbstractThe property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent.
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