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Xu, Genjiu and Driessen, T.S.H. and Sun, Hao (2008) Matrix analysis for associated consistency in cooperative game theory. Linear Algebra and its Applications, 428 (7). pp. 1571-1586. ISSN 0024-3795 *** ISI Impact 0,974 ***
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.laa.2007.10.002
Hamiache axiomatized the Shapley value as the unique solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity and associated consistency. Driessen extended Hamiache’s axiomatization to the enlarged class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values. In this paper, we introduce the notion of row (resp. column)-coalitional matrix in the framework of cooperative game theory. The Shapley value as well as the associated game are represented algebraically by their coalitional matrices called the Shapley standard matrix and the associated transformation matrix , respectively. We develop a matrix approach for Hamiache’s axiomatization of the Shapley value. The associated consistency for the Shapley value is formulated as the matrix equality . The diagonalization procedure of and the inessential property for coalitional matrices are fundamental tools to prove the convergence of the sequence of repeated associated games as well as its limit game to be inessential. In addition, a similar matrix approach is applicable to study Driessen’s axiomatization of a certain class of linear values. In summary, it is illustrated that matrix analysis is a new and powerful technique for research in the field of cooperative game theory.
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