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Heydenreich, B. and Mishra, D. and Müller, R. and Uetz, M.J.
(2008)
Optimal mechanisms for single machine scheduling.
In: Internet And Network Economics (WINE 2008), 17-20 Dec, 2008, Shanghai, China.
pp. 414-425.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5385.
Springer Verlag.
ISSN 0302-9743
ISBN 978-3-540-92184-4
Full text available as:
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_47  AbstractWe study the design of optimal mechanisms in a setting here job-agents compete for being processed by a service provider that can handle one job at a time. Each job has a processing time and incurs a waiting cost. Jobs need to be compensated for waiting. We consider two models, one where only the waiting costs of jobs are private information (1-d), and another where both waiting costs and processing times are private (2-d). An optimal mechanism minimizes the total expected expenses to compensate all jobs, while it has to be Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. We derive closed formulae for the optimal mechanism in the 1-d case and show that it is efficient for symmetric jobs. For nonsymmetric jobs, we show that efficient mechanisms perform arbitrarily bad. For the 2-d case, we prove that the optimal mechanism in general does not even satisfy IIA, the ‘independent of irrelevant alternatives’ condition. We also show that the optimal mechanism is not even efficient for symmetric agents in the 2-d case.
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