On the Security of the Mobile IP Protocol Family

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I. Abstract

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has worked on network layer mobility for more than 10 years and a number of RFCs are available by now. Although the IETF mobility protocols are not present in the Internet infrastructure as of today, deployment seems to be imminent since a number of organizations, including 3GPP, 3GPP2 and Wimax, have realized the need to incorporate these protocols into their architectures. Deployment scenarios reach from mobility support within the network of a single provider to mobility support between different providers and technologies. Current Wimax specifications, for example, already support Mobile IPv4, Proxy Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6. Future specifications will also support Proxy Mobile IPv6. Upcoming specifications in the 3GPP Evolved Packet Core (EPC) will include the use of Mobile IPv4, Dual Stack MIPv6 and Proxy Mobile IPv6 for interworking between 3GPP and non 3GPP networks.

This paper provides an overview on the state-of-the-art in IETF mobility protocols as they are being considered by standardization organizations outside the IETF and focusing on security aspects.

II. The Need for Security

Mobile IP [3], [20] offers a reachability service for mobile nodes (MNs) in which an MN is always identified by the same IP address, namely its home address, regardless of its current point of attachment to the Internet. While away from home a mobile node associates an other IP address, its care-of address with its home address with the help of mobility signalling. The care-of address provides the information about the mobile node’s current location. Packets addressed to a mobile node’s home address are tunneled to its care-of address. The mobility signaling for this type of communication happens between the mobile node (MN) and the home agent (HA). The details of the mobility signaling procedures are different for IPv4 and IPv6 but the underlying principles are the same. The description in this document focuses mainly on IPv6 since it reflects the more recent development in mobility signaling.

Mobile IPv6 supports establishing a bi-directional tunnel between the MN and the HA such that the traffic between a MN and a CN is routed through the HA in both directions. Alternatively, Mobile IPv6 offers triangular routing and route optimization [3], [21]. In the former case, packets from a MN are directly addressed to the corresponding node (CN) whereas packets in the reverse direction travel through the HA. In the latter case, packets are directly exchanged between the MN and the CN without involving the HA. In order to get this procedure to work there is the need to perform mobility signaling between MN, HA and CN. Although route optimization is preferred from a performance point of view network operators prefer to have a tight control over the data traffic and plan to disable this functionality.

In addition to the basic mobility signaling protocols [3], [20], performance enhancements were developed. An example is Hierarchical Mobile IP (HMIP [22]), which allows signaling and data traffic to be routed locally in the visited network to which the MN is attached as long as MN moves within the visited network. As a consequence, local mobility anchor points had to be introduced into the architecture. Fig. 1 shows all the involved entities. Another example is Fast Handovers for Mobile IP (FMIP [23]), which accelerates the reestablishment of IP connectivity for a moving MN e.g. by establishing a tunnel between the old and new CoA at the access routers in order to overcome the latency of binding updates. So far, these localized mobility schemes have largely a theoretical character.

![Fig. 1. Entities in the Mobile Internet Architecture](image-url)
from the MN.

With all these mobility signaling protocols that can run between the MN, HA, CN, local mobility anchors and at access routers the classical communication security problems arise: authentication and key establishment between the signaling nodes, integrity protection, replay protection and in some cases confidentiality protection of the signaling traffic.

To provide integrity and replay protection of mobility signaling in MIPv6 between the MN and the HA two approaches were developed; IPsec protection [3] and an approach similar to Mobile IPv4 called MIPv6 Authentication Protocol [6]. For IPsec protection IKEv2 [5] in concert with EAP and Diameter EAP [8] was selected for authentication and key exchange between MN and HA. If the MIPv6 Auth. Protocol is used, then the keys required for integrity and replay protection between MN and HA are derived from keys established between MN and home AAA prior to MIPv6 usage. In Wimax and 3GPP both security approaches are currently under consideration.

Both approaches to secure MIPv6 require the interaction with the AAA infrastructure. This interaction of mobility signaling with the back-end infrastructure also allows to simplify configuration tasks, such as the configuration of Home Agents and Home Addresses, and offers key distribution capability (a feature that is needed for the MIPv6 Authentication Protocol). This work is referred to as Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping [7], [10], and investigates two scenarios: the integrated scenario [24] and the split scenario [4]. In the integrated scenario the network access authentication procedure run between the MN, the AAA client (e.g., access router), local AAA and the home AAA server is used to convey parameters and to establish the keying material for subsequent mobility signaling. This back-end interaction is described in [12], [25], [27]. Another related open issue is location privacy [16], [26]: revealing the care-of address to the CN can reveal location information to the CN and eavesdropping on binding updates can allow an outsider to track the movement of the MN. The work in these problem areas is still ongoing.

### III. Conclusion

The specification of the basic mobility signaling protocols including the PMIP protocols can be considered matured. Nevertheless, there are still related open issues to be solved. An example for such an issue is that currently firewalls are typically not aware of MIP-related traffic and therefore interferes with MIP signaling. The problem and some solutions are described in [12], [25], [27].

### References


